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A nuclear reactor is a device in which nuclear chain reactions are initiated, controlled, and sustained at a steady rate, as opposed to a nuclear bomb, in which the chain reaction occurs in a fraction of a second and is uncontrolled.
The most significant use of nuclear reactors is as an energy source for the generation of electrical power and for the power in some ships. This is usually accomplished by methods that involve using heat from the nuclear reaction to power steam turbines.
The key components common to most types of nuclear power plants are:
Conventional thermal power plants all have a fuel source to provide heat. Examples are gas, coal, or oil. For a nuclear power plant, this heat is provided by nuclear fission inside the nuclear reactor. When a relatively large fissile atomic nucleus (usually uranium-235 or plutonium-239) is struck by a neutron it forms two or more smaller nuclei as fission products, releasing energy and neutrons in a process called nuclear fission. The neutrons then trigger further fission. And so on. When this nuclear chain reaction is controlled, the energy released can be used to heat water, produce steam and drive a turbine that generates electricity. A nuclear explosive involves an uncontrolled chain reaction, and the rate of fission in a reactor is not capable of reaching sufficient levels to trigger a nuclear explosion because commercial reactor grade nuclear fuel is not enriched to a high enough level. Enriched uranium is uranium in which the percent composition of uranium-235 has been increased from that of uranium found in nature. Natural uranium is only 0.72% uranium-235, with the rest being mostly uranium-238 (99.2745%) and a tiny fraction is uranium-234 (0.0055%).
Nuclear Reactors are classified by several methods, a brief outline of these classification schemes is provided.
Used by thermal reactors.
Classification by phase of fuel
There are two types of nuclear power in current use:
More than a dozen advanced reactor designs are in various stages of development. Some are evolutionary from the PWR, BWR and PHWR designs above, some are more radical departures. The former include the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), two of which are now operating with others are under construction, and the planned passively safe ESBWR and AP1000 units.
Generation IV reactors are a set of theoretical nuclear reactor designs currently being researched. These designs are generally not expected to be available for commercial construction before 2030. Current reactors in operation around the world are generally considered second- or third-generation systems, with the first-generation systems having been retired some time ago. Research into these reactor types was officially started by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) based on eight technology goals. The primary goals being to improve nuclear safety, improve proliferation resistance, minimize waste and natural resource utilization, and to decrease the cost to build and run such plants.
Designs which are theoretically possible, but which are not being actively considered or researched at present. Though such reactors could be built with current or near term technology, they trigger little interest for reasons of economics, practicality, or safety.
Controlled nuclear fusion could in principle be used in fusion power plants to produce power without the complexities of handling actinides, but significant scientific and technical obstacles remain. Several fusion reactors have been built, but as yet none has 'produced' more thermal energy than electrical energy consumed. Despite research having started in the 1950s, no commercial fusion reactor is expected before 2050. The ITER project is currently leading the effort to commercialize fusion power.
Thermal reactors generally depend on refined and enriched uranium. Some nuclear reactors can operate with a mixture of plutonium and uranium (see MOX). The process by which uranium ore is mined, processed, enriched, used, possibly reprocessed and disposed of is known as the nuclear fuel cycle.
Under 1% of the uranium found in nature is the easily fissionable U-235 isotope and as a result most reactor designs require enriched fuel. Enrichment involves increasing the percentage of U-235 and is usually done by means of gaseos diffusion or gas centrifuge. The enriched result is then converted into uranium dioxide powder, which is pressed and fired onto pellet form. These pellets are stacked into tubes which are then sealed and called fuel rods. Many of these fuel rods are used in each nuclear reactor.
Most BWR and PWR commercial reactors use uranium enriched to about 4% U-235, many research reactors use highly enriched, or weapons grade uranium, while some commercial reactors with a high neutron economy do not require the fuel to be enriched at all.
It should be noted that fissionable U-235 and non-fissionable U-238 are both used in the fission process. U-235 is fissionable by thermal (i.e. slow-moving) neutrons. A thermal neutron is one which is moving about the same speed as the atoms around it. Since all atoms vibrate proportional to their absolute temperature, a thermal neutron has the best opportunity to fission U-235 when it is moving at this same vibrational speed. On the other hand, U-238 is more likely to capture a neutron when the neutron is moving very fast. This U-239 atom will soon decay into plutonium-239, which is another fuel. Pu-239 is a viable fuel and must be accounted for even when a highly enriched uranium fuel is used. Plutonium fissions will dominate the U-235 fissions in some reactors, especially after the initial loading of U-235 is spent. Plutonium is fissionable with both fast and thermal neutrons, which make it ideal for either nuclear reactors or nuclear bombs.
Most reactor designs in existence are thermal reactors and typically use water as a neutron moderator (moderator means that it slows down the neutron to a thermal speed) and as a coolant. But in a fast breeder reactor, some other kind of coolant is used which will not moderate or slow the neutrons down much. This enables fast neutrons to dominate, which can effectively be used to constantly replenish the fuel supply. By merely placing cheap unenriched uranium into such a core, the non-fissionable U-238 will be turned into Pu-239, "breeding" fuel.
The amount of energy in the reservoir of nuclear fuel is frequently expressed in terms of "full-power days," which is the number of 24-hour periods (days) a reactor is scheduled for operation at full power output for the generation of heat energy. The number of full-power days in a reactor's operating cycle (between refueling outage times) is related to the amount of fissile uranium-235 (U-235) contained in the fuel assemblies at the beginning of the cycle. A higher percentage of U-235 in the core at the beginning of a cycle will permit the reactor to be run for a greater number of full-power days.
At the end of the operating cycle, the fuel in some of the assemblies is "spent," and is discharged and replaced with new (fresh) fuel assemblies. Although in practice, it is the buildup of reaction poisons in nuclear fuel that determines the lifetime of nuclear fuel in a reactor; long before all possible fissions have taken place, the buildup of long-lived neutron absorbing fission products damps out the chain reaction. The fraction of the reactor's fuel core replaced during refueling is typically one-fourth for a boiling-water reactor and one-third for a pressurized-water reactor.
Not all reactors need to be shut down for refueling; for example, pebble bed reactors, RBMK reactors, molten salt reactors, Magnox, AGR and CANDU reactors allow fuel to be shifted through the reactor while it is running. In a CANDU reactor, this also allows individual fuel elements to be moved about within the reactor core to places that are best suited to the amount of U-235 in the fuel element.
The amount of energy extracted from nuclear fuel is called its "burn up," which is expressed in terms of the heat energy produced per initial unit of fuel weight. Burn up is commonly expressed as megawatt days thermal per metric ton of initial heavy metal.
Although mankind has only tamed nuclear power recently, the first nuclear reactors were naturally occurring. A natural nuclear fission reactor can occur under certain circumstances that mimic the conditions in a constructed reactor. Fifteen natural fission reactors have so far been found in three separate ore deposits at the Oklo mine in Gabon, West Africa. First discovered in 1972 by French physicist Francis Perrin, they are collectively known as the Oklo Fossil Reactors. These reactors ran for approximately 150 million years, averaging 100 kW of power output during that time. The concept of a natural nuclear reactor was theorized as early as 1956 by Paul Kuroda at the University of Arkansas.
Such reactors can no longer form on Earth: radioactive decay over this immense time span has reduced the proportion of U-235 in naturally occurring uranium to below the amount required to sustain a chain reaction.
The natural nuclear reactors formed when a uranium-rich mineral deposit became inundated with groundwater that acted as a neutron moderator, and a strong chain reaction took place. The water moderator would boil away as the reaction increased, slowing it back down again and preventing a meltdown. The fission reaction was sustained for hundreds of thousands of years.
These natural reactors are extensively studied by scientists interested in geologic radioactive waste disposal. They offer a case study of how radioactive isotopes migrate through the earth's crust. This is a significant area of controversy as opponents of geologic waste disposal fear that isotopes from stored waste could end up in water supplies or be carried into the environment.
Instrumentation & Control
Every country is designing nuclear power plants to improve the plant's availability, safety, ease of operation and/or acceptability by the public and regulators. The appropriate balance of automation and manual operation is the subject of considerable debate in the U.S. and Europe today. Most researchers agree that today's technology would support digital automation of all the major systems in a power plant. One of the concerns, however, is how to verify and validate the required software.
In the U.S., the transition from today's nuclear control systems to more automated future designs is likely to occur in phases. One of the purposes of this study was to determine where the European concepts were in terms of evolution of I&C. The U.S. transition may be described in terms of four levels. The solid diamonds represent a plant that is operational; empty diamonds represent plants that are not yet operational.
![[figure 26]](http://www.wtec.org/loyola/ar93_94/fig26.gif)
Nuclear Plant I&C State of the Art
In level 1, some of today's analog controllers will be replaced with more reliable digital controllers performing basic proportional-integral-differential (PID) control. This phase of evolution is already under way in the U.S. Generally, digital implementations of control systems on U.S. reactors have been one-for-one replacements of the original analog systems and have not taken full advantage of recent technological developments. As the chart shows, the panel thinks U.S. LWRs are in the beginning of level 1. The French plant Bugey is a little further advanced but also in level 1, while the Japanese Tokyo Electric Power Company's Kashiwazaki-1 and -2 are at the interface with the next level.
Level 2 of the predicted transition will include automation of routine procedures like plant start-up, shut-down, refueling, load changes, and certain emergency response procedures. Significant assistance will be given to the operator through computer-based expert systems and control room displays of plant status. Control will be implemented with digital technology. The newly completed Darlington plant in Canada is at level 2, as are the U.S. Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) and the newest French plant (the N4 class). The German ISAR-II is between levels 2 and 3.
Level 3 is a significant advance toward automation with the operator interacting with and monitoring an intelligent, adaptive supervisory control system. Smart sensors will be expected to validate signals and communicate with fault-tolerant process controllers. Control strategies will be adaptive, and very robust to off-normal conditions. Advanced LMR (PRISM) concepts and MHTGR concepts being studied by the U.S. DOE will have these capabilities. The newest Canadian concept, the CANDU 3, is placed in this category, as is the Japanese Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR).
Level 4 is total automation of the plant, with an intelligent control system aware of operational status and in interactive communication with the operator to keep him apprised of any degraded conditions, likely consequences of these conditions, and possible strategies for minimizing deleterious consequences. At this point most plant functions will be automated and robotized including maintenance and security surveillance.
The control and information system will be an integral part of not only the total plant design, but also the national network of commercial power plants. The control system computer will learn from the network relevant information concerning other plants and component operational experience, and will alert the operator if that experience is relevant to his plant. No U.S. design has gone this far in incorporating advanced technology and automation. The Japanese Frontier Research Group on Artificial Intelligence is working on conceptual definition of a plant of this type. In the evolution of higher levels of automation, the designers will try to improve all aspects of nuclear power plants, including safety and reliability. Progress in all countries should build on successes and experiences in other countries
Nuclear Power Reactos Include the Folling Instrumentation
INSTRUMENTATION CHARACTERISTICS
The design should include provisions forin-service testing. The instruments should be capable of periodic channel checks during normal plant operation.
The instruments should have the capability for in-place functional testing.
Instrumentation that has sensors located in inaccessible areas should contain provisions for data recording in an accessible location, and the instrumentation should provide an external remote alarm to indicate actuation.
The instrumentation should record, at a minimum, 3 seconds of low-amplitude motion prior to seismic trigger actuation, continue to record the motion during the period in which the earthquake motion exceeds the seismic trigger threshold, and continue to record low-amplitude motion for a minimum of 5 seconds beyond the last exceedance of the seismic trigger threshold.
The instrumentation should be capable of recording 25 minutes of sensed motion.
The battery should be of sufficient capacity to power the instrumentation to sense and record (see Regulatory Position 4.5) 25 minutes of motion over a period of not less than the channel check test interval (Regulatory Position 8.2). This can be accomplished by providing enough battery capacity for a minimum of 25 minutes of system operation at any time over a 24-hour period, without recharging, in combination with a battery charger whose line power is connected to an uninterruptable power supply or a line source with an alarm that is checked at least every 24 hours. Other combinations of larger battery capacity and alarm intervals may be used.
Acceleration Sensors
The dynamic range should be 1000:1 zero to peak, or greater; for example, 0.001g to 1.0g.
The frequency range should be 0.20 Hz to 50 Hz or an equivalent demonstrated to be adequate by computational techniques applied to the resultant accelerogram.
Recorder
The sample rate should be at least 200 samples per second in each of the three directions.
The bandwidth should be at least from 0.20 Hz to 50 Hz.
The dynamic range should be 1000:1 or greater, and the instrumentation should be able to record at least 1.0g zero to peak.
Seismic Trigger
The actuating level should be adjustable and within the range of 0.001g to 0.02g.
INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION
The instrumentation should be designed and installed so that the mounting is rigid.
The instrumentation should be oriented so that the horizontal components are parallel to theorthogonal horizontal axes assumed in the seismic analysis.
Protection against accidental impacts should be provided.
INSTRUMENTATION ACTUATION
Both vertical and horizontal input vibratory ground motion should actuate the same time-history accelerograph. One or more seismic triggers may be used to accomplish this.
Spurious triggering should be avoided.
The seismic trigger mechanisms of the time-history accelerograph should be set for a threshold ground acceleration of not more than 0.02g.
REMOTE INDICATION
Triggering of the free-field or any foundation-level time-history accelerograph should be annunciated in the control room. If there is more than one control room at the site, annunciation should be provided to each control room.
MAINTENANCE
The purpose of the maintenance program is to ensure that the equipment will perform as required. As stated in Regulatory Position 3, the maintenance and repair procedures should provide for keeping the maximum number of instruments in service during plant operation and shutdown.
Systems are to be given channel checks every 2 weeks for the first 3 months of service after startup. Failures of devices normally occur during initial operation. After the initial 3-month period and 3 consecutive successful checks, monthly channel checks are sufficient. The monthly channel check is to include checking the batteries. The channel functional test should be performed every 6 months. Channel calibration should be performed during each refueling outage at a minimum.
Acceleration Sensor An instrument capable of sensing absolute acceleration and transmitting the data to a recorder.
Accessible Instruments Instruments or sensors whose locations permit ready access during plant operation without violation of applicable safety regulations, such as those of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or regulations dealing with plant security or radiation protection safety.
Channel Calibration (Primary Calibration) The determination and, if required, adjustment of an instrument, sensor, or system such that it responds within a specific range and accuracy to an acceleration, velocity, or displacement input, as applicable, or responds to an acceptable physical constant.
Channel Check The qualitative verification of the functional status of the instrument sensor. This check is an "in-situ" test and may be the same as a channel functional test.
Channel Functional Test (Secondary Calibration) The determination without adjustment that an instrument, sensor, or system responds to a known input of such character that it will verify the instrument, sensor, or system is functioning in a manner that can be calibrated.
Nonaccessible Instruments Instruments or sensors in locations that do not permit ready access during plant operation because of a risk of violating applicable plant operating safety regulations, such as OSHA, or regulations dealing with plant security or radiation protection safety.
Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion (OBE) The vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The value of the OBE is set by the applicant.
Primary Containment The principal structure of a unit that acts as the barrier, after the fuel cladding and reactor pressure boundary, to control the release of radioactive material. The primary containment includes (1) the containment structure and its access openings, penetrations, and appurtenances, (2) the valves, pipes, closed systems, and other components used to isolate the containment atmosphere from the environment, and (3) those systems or portions of systems that, by their system functions, extend the containment structure boundary (e.g., the connecting steam and feedwater piping) and provide effective isolation.
Recorder An instrument capable of simultaneously recording the data versus time from an acceleration sensor or sensors.
Secondary Containment The structure surrounding the primary containment that acts as a further barrier to control the release of radioactive material.
Seismic Isolator A device (for instance, laminated elastomer and steel) installed between the structure and its foundation to reduce the acceleration of the isolated structure, as well as the attached equipment and components.
Seismic Trigger A device that starts the time-history accelerograph.
Time-History Accelerograph An instrument capable of sensing and permanently recording the absolute acceleration versus time. The components of the time-history accelerograph (acceleration sensor, recorder, seismic trigger) may be assembled in a self-contained unit or may be separately located.
Triaxial Describes the function of an instrument or group of instruments oriented in three mutuallyorthogonal directions, one of which is vertical.
SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION TYPE AND LOCATION
Solid-state digital instrumentation that will enable the processing of data at the plant site within 4 hours of the seismic event should be used.
A triaxial time-history accelerograph should be provided at the following locations:
Free-field.
Containment foundation.
Two elevations (excluding the foundation) on a structure inside the containment.
An independent Seismic Category I structure foundation where the response is different from that of the containment structure.
An elevation (excluding the foundation) on the independent Seismic Category I structure selected in 4 above.
If seismic isolators are used, instrumentation should be placed on both the rigid and isolated portions of the same or an adjacent structure, as appropriate, at approximately the same elevations.
he specific locations for instrumentation should be determined by the nuclear plant designer to obtain the most pertinent information consistent with maintaining occupational radiation exposures ALARA for the location, installation, and maintenance of seismic instrumentation. In general:
The free-field sensors should be located and installed so that they record the motion of the ground surface and so that the effects associated with surface features, buildings, and components on the recorded ground motion will be insignificant.
The in-structure instrumentation should be placed at locations that have been modeled as mass points in the building dynamic analysis so that the measured motion can be directly compared with the design spectra. The instrumentation should not be located on a secondary structural frame member that is not modeled as a mass point in the building dynamic model.
A design review of the location, installation, and maintenance of proposed instrumentation for maintaining exposures ALARA should be performed by the facility in the planning stage in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable."
Instrumentation should be placed in a location with as low a dose rate as is practical, consistent with other requirements.
Instruments should be selected to require minimal maintenance and in-service inspection, as well as minimal time and numbers of personnel to conduct installation and maintenance.
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Failure Analysis
Creek Bridge Business Complex
12 Glen Falls Circle
Salinas, CA 93906
United States
ph: 831-443-4502
fax: 831-443-4502
sales